An oshore nancial center (OFC) is generally dened as a jurisdiction in which the nancial sector is disproportionately larger than the domestic economy. OFC's oer signicant tax and regulatory advantages as well as providing clients from unstable countries with international banking services. For a country with a large degree of outward OFC investment, tax collections are likely to be lower and accurate risk assessment becomes more dicult. What factors determine which countries have investors that more heavily utilize OFC's than others? I assess this question using a panel data set covering 63 source countries investing in over 200 foreign jurisdictions. I nd that there tends to be less outward OFC investment from countries with more economic freedom and low levels of corruption. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in economic freedom is predicted to reduce the share of foreign investment that goes to OFC's by 8-12 percentage points, while a similar increase in the control of corruption is predicted to reduce OFC investment by nearly 6 percentage points. OFC investment tends to be higher in countries with strong enforcement of regulations, suggesting that investors in these countries turn to OFC's since they cannot bypass these regulations domestically. There is also some evidence that countries compete indirectly with OFC's, being forced to lower taxes or face a ight of capital to these jurisdictions.
Introduction
Oshore Financial Centers (OFC's) play a signicant role in international capital ows. In 2008, there was $6.1 trillion dollars of portfolio investment across 49 OFC's, nearly equal to the amount invested in the UK, Germany, and France combined.
1 One way to dene an OFC is an economy with a nancial sector of disproportionate size to their resident population. Why do investors use OFC's? Gonzalez and Schipke (2011) identify several ways in which OFC's compete with onshore banks, from greater property rights protection, legal and tax advantages, and getting around domestic nancial regulations. Given these advantages, it stands to reason that there are national level characteristics that will induce investors in some countries to more heavily utilize OFC's than others.
In this paper, I assess these national level characteristics.
Why do we care about OFC's? First, a signicant fraction of global capital ows through these jurisdictions en route to their nal destination. Understanding why some countries tend to utilize these intermediaries more than others gives us a better understanding of not only the true exposure of a country's external claims and liabilities, but also what policies a country could take to limit (or even expand!) the use of OFC's. As to the rst point, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) point out that the Cayman Islands were the largest holders of US mortgage backed securities in 2007 and 2008 . Given that the ultimate owners of these securities are almost certainly not residents of the Cayman Islands, it would be of great benet to gain a better understanding of what countries have exposure to these toxic assets through OFC's.
As for the second point, there are a number of reasons why a country might want to limit the use of OFC's by its residents. Clearly tax avoidance is a big benet of utilizing OFC's and cutting down on their use should increase government tax revenues. For example Hines (2010) nds that for US multinationals with subsidiaries in OFC's, only about 6% of employment and physical capital is located in these jurisdictions. However, a staggering 42% of reported income is earned in these OFC's. As it is unlikely that 6% of labor and capital are earning 42% of income, it would appear that these multinationals are channeling income to the OFC subsidiary to lower their tax burden. Evans (2009) proles several US multinationals that had subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands, including such giants as Coca-Cola, Del Monte, Intel, and Seagate Technologies.
In 2008, Seagate only paid a 5% eective tax rate, in large part due to shifting income toward its OFC subsidiary. With regards to the advantages of utilizing OFC's, a Seagate spokesman stated, the competitive benets relate both to taxes saved on certain income earned outside of the United States and the ability to eciently deploy assets around the globe to remain competitive. That being said, there are a number of studies that make a case for the benecial aspects of OFC's. Rose and Spiegel (2007) nd that commercial banks in countries close to tax havens have lower interest rate spreads, reecting greater competition between onshore and oshore banks. In particular, doubling the distance from the nearest tax haven results in an interested rate spread that is 1.63 percentage points higher. This is especially relevant in developing countries in which nancial markets are generally dominated by a few large (and often state owned) banks. The presence of a nearby OFC provides the nancial competition and depth necessary to push capital market eciency forward. Rose and Spiegel nd further evidence of this, with countries close to OFC's tending to extend more credit to the private sector, have greater aggregate market borrowing, and have higher levels of M2 (reecting more money being created by the banking system.) Hines (2010) nds that countries located closer to OFC's had a 2.56 percent average annual per capita real economic growth rates between 1992 and 2006, compared to 2.14 percent for the rest of the world. Of course this may reect a simultaneity problem, as OFC's may develop close to rapidly growing economies. Hines also argues that OFC's may also increase direct investment in high tax countries. If a multinational can route it's investment through an OFC, they may be wiling to make an indirect investment in a country with taxes so high that a more direct investment strategy would have never taken place. Further evidence of this is given by Blanco and Rogers (2009) , who nd positive FDI spillovers from neighboring OFC's to less developed countries.
Much of the existing literature has looked at two issues relating to this topic: why some countries become OFC's and the economic impact of these OFC's.
The novelty of my study is to build upon these two strands and ask a new question: what national level characteristics cause a country to more heavily use OFC's than others? To my knowledge, there are no other studies that examine this issue. To answer this question, the rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 looks at the jurisdictions that are classied as OFC's, considering the denition of an OFC and the amount of capital owing through these centers. Section 3 presents an empirical methodology to assess the national level characteristics that determine OFC usage. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical model and Section 5 concludes.
2 Dening and Assessing OFC's Table 1 The IMF list is based on countries in which a signicant amount of ncal activity involves oshore parties on both sides of the transaction. The OECD list is based on countries classied as "tax havens," dened as a jurisdiction in which there are signicantly lower taxes on nancial transactions and limited disclosure of tax information on clients.
From Table 1 , we see that the OECD list contains the IMF list. Several countries stand out as exceptions when comparing the two lists. Austria, Belgium, and
Hungary are fairly large economies that are considered to be tax havens by the OECD, but not OFC's by the IMF. Similarly, the Bermuda, the Maldives, and the US Virgin Islands may qualify as tax havens, but do not have enough oshore nancial activity to be classied as OFC's by the IMF. While these lists are fairly close, there are enough dierences that I use both denitions in this study. As will be seen, though, the key results are the same for both denitions.
A number of studies have examined why some countries become OFC's. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) nd that OFC's score very well on the World Bank's cross-country measures of governance quality that include measures of accountability, political stability, government eectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. This is not surprising, given that one of the advantages of using an OFC is the improved governance oered over the investor's home country.
An OFC without good governance would have a hard time attracting foreign investment.
Just how large a role do OFC's play in global capital ows? Table 2 Governance Indicators, I collect data on regulatory quality, which reects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
I also gather data on government eectiveness, which reects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 4 The original data is actually from 0 to 100, but I scale down for ease of exposition (40) has one of the lowest OFC investment shares at only 2.0%. There are both rich countries and poor countries in both the top and bottom 12, large and small economies, countries with good and bad regulatory quality and government eectiveness. All of this points to the need to assess the determinants of OFC investment using a multivariate approach.
I assess the determinants of OFC investment shares using the following econometric model:
OF CI i,t = β 0 + β 1 EconF ree i,t + β 2 F iscalF ree i,t + β 3 InvF ree i,t +β 4 F inF ree i,t + β 5 P rop i,t + β 6 Corrupt i,t + β 7 RegQ i,t +β 8 GovEf f i,t + β 9 ln GDP i,t + β 10 ln GDP pc i,t +β 11 ln P op i,t + β 12 Sav i,t + β 13 Inf i,t + α i + δ t + u i,t 8 
Discussion
The results from the econometric model for both denitions of OFC's are presented in Table 4 . Freedom has a negative impact on OFC investment, but only for the IMF list.
A one standard deviation increase in nancial freedom (limited interference of the government in nancial markets) yields a 1.7 percentage point decrease in OFC investment share. That this result does not hold for the OECD list suggests that there is some unique aspect of the countries that are not on the IMF list with regard to this variable. This is denitely a result that merits more investigation in a future draft of this study.
Looking at the variables relating to property rights protection and corruption, we see to contrasting results. First, property rights protection does not appear to have a signicant eect on OFC investment shares in either specication. This is perhaps not surprising given the heterogeneity of countries in the top and bottom lists of Table 3 . That being said, corruption does appear to matter. The control of corruption variable is signicantly negative for both specications.
This variable has a standard deviation of 1.012 (it ranges from -2.5 to +2.5), so a one standard deviation increase in government control of corruption induces a nearly 6 percentage point decrease in OFC investment share. This suggests that investors in corrupt countries are indeed utilizing the international banking services oered by OFC's. These positive results suggest that investors in countries with strong enforcement of regulations and eective governments are more likely to utilize OFC's.
One explanation for this is that these investors have a more pressing need to utilize OFC's in countries with good governance since they have a harder time skirting regulations than in countries with weak enforcement of regulations.
It does not appear OFC investment shares are being aected by economic size, population, average income, or even ination. The only variable in this set that appears to matter is the savings rate. The standard deviation of the savings rate variable is 10.3, implying that a one standard deviation increase in the savings rate will cause OFC investment shares to increase by about 2 percentage points.
A country with a high savings rate will have more money in general to invest, either at home or abroad. It appears that they are weakly choosing to send more of their foreign investments to OFC's than countries with lower savings rates.
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to evaluate what national level factors inuenced the degree to which investors in a country utilize OFC's. The results of this study suggest that economic freedom is a major deterrent to OFC investment. As economic freedom in a country increases, investors in that country increasingly turn away from OFC's. However, economic freedom is a rather general term and the specic components of economic freedom yield some confounding results.
Investors in countries with lower tax burdens appear to invest more in OFC's, though this may be due to reverse causality, with OFC competition driving down tax rates in neighboring countries. Fewer regulations on international capital tend to increase OFC investment, but less government involvement in nancial markets reduces it. Countries with strong regulatory enforcement tend to experience more OFC investment, suggesting that investors in these countries have a harder time avoiding domestic regulations and therefore choose to park their money in an OFC without such strong (or strongly enforced) regulations.
Finally, a country seeking to reduce OFC investment would be well suited to control corruption within its own borders as this appears to be pushing money into OFC's.
Understanding what factors induce investors to utilize OFC's is important for several reasons. Investment in an OFC may represent lower tax collections for
